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SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
Judd F. Sneirson*
Corporations, like the rest of us, must comply with environmental
and other laws or suffer the consequences. Unfortunately, these
consequences can pale in comparison to the gains to be made from
non-compliance. Law-and-economics scholarship recognizes this
and, by treating many laws as mere costs of doing business,
encourages a certain amount of deliberate non-compliance.
According to this view, corporate compliance should turn on
profitability or whether compliance would otherwise benefit the firm.
This Article argues that the law-and-economics scholarship is wrong
on the law, wrong as a matter of economics, and does not reflect how
most firms in fact behave. As for the firms that do flout applicable
laws in the name of profit, the Article advances corporate law
proposals and other solutions to rebalance cost-benefit analyses in
favor of compliance.
I. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND THE PROFIT MOTIVE

Corporate law requires fiduciaries to act faithfully, loyally, and
carefully, and comply with applicable laws. The first three of these
precepts comprise the traditional "triads of ... fiduciary duty-good

faith, loyalty, and due care"-that together address many of the legal
* Associate Professor, Savannah Law School. I thank my co-panelists at Fordham
Environmental Law Review and Florida Coastal School of Law conferences;
research assistants Maitry Halder (Hofstra Law School Class of 2014) and Jesse
Centrella (Savannah Law School Class of 2015); and the patient editors at the
FordhamEnvironmentalLaw Review.
1. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). In Disney
and Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court reclassified the triad of duties into
two categories: a broad duty of loyalty encompassing a duty to act attentively and
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issues that arise in corporate governance. 2 The obligation to comply
with the law gets far less attention, yet corporate compliance
decisions can have a tremendous impact on the firm, its bottom line,
and those affected by the firm's non-compliance. This Part will set
out corporate fiduciaries' compliance obligations, analyze the
requirement through the lens of law and economics, and posit how
corporations, in fact, behave.
A.

CorporateCompliance Obligations

Corporate law requires fiduciaries to take reasonable steps to
ensure that the firm complies with applicable laws, and put into place
an information-and-control structure to aid in this effort. 3 In addition
to this monitoring obligation, corporate fiduciaries must themselves
manage the firm in accordance with applicable laws.4 A failure to do
so-for example, knowing that the firm is out of compliance and
failing to act to rectify the situation, or affirmatively causing the firm
to break the law-would not only amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty, 5 it would also fall outside the scope of the business judgment
rule 6 and any director-exculpation charter provisions. 7
in good faith as defined in more detail in those cases, and a duty of care. See In re
Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del. 2006) (en banc); Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). Thus, the obligation to act in good faith
continues to bind corporate fiduciaries, but it now resides somewhere within an
expanded conception of managers' loyalty duty.
2. Revlon and Unocal duties build on the triad and apply in certain takeover
contexts. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239-40 (Del. 2009)
(noting that "Revlon did not create any new fiduciary duties" and analyzing the
Lyondell board's compliance with its care, good faith, and loyalty obligations).
3. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971-72 (Del. Ch.
1996). According to Stone v. Ritter, liability for the failure to adequately monitor
attaches where the board either entirely fails to implement any information-andcontrol structure, or has such a structure but consciously fails to oversee its
operations. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
4. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 507 F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir.
1974) (applying New York law); In re Massey Energy Co., No. CIV.A. 5430-VCS,
2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) ("Delaware law does not
charter law breakers."); Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm.
Technologies, 854 A.2d 121. 163-64 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also A.L.I, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b)(1) (obligating corporations, "to the same
extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law").
5. See Miller, 507 F.2d at 762 ("[I]llegal acts may amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty."); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007))
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Importantly, this rule holds even where non-compliance, after the
payment of any fines, would prove the more profitable course:
"Under Delaware law, a fiduciary may not choose to manage an
entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the
illegal activity will result in profits for the entity." 8 Likewise under
New York law, directors are liable for illegal acts "even though
committed to benefit the corporation." 9

("Delaware corporate law has long been clear on this rather obvious notion ... that

it is utterly inconsistent with one's duty of fidelity to the corporation to consciously
cause the corporation to act unlawfully."); Metro Commc 'n, 854 A.2d at 131.
6. See Miller, 507 F.2d at 762 (holding that "the business judgment rule cannot
insulate the defendant directors from liability if they did in fact breach [a campaign
finance law]"); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. 1968)
(excepting fraud and illegality from the protection of the business judgment rule).
7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2014) (permitting charter
provisions that eliminate directors' personal liability for duty-of-care violations but
not for "knowing violation[s] of [the] law"); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 7.19 (same for "knowing and culpable violation[s] of law"). The
Revised Model Business Corporation Act's director exculpation provision, by
contrast, is limited to "intentional violations of criminal law." See REV. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4)(D) (emphasis added). Unlawful activity is also
outside the scope of a corporation's indemnification power. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (no power to indemnify a person who "had... reasonable
cause to believe that the ... conduct was unlawful").

8. See Metro Commc'n, 854 A.2d at 131; see also Desimone, 924 A.2d at 93435 ("The knowing use of illegal means to pursue profit for the corporation is
director misconduct."); In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479 at *20 ("Delaware law
allows corporations to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical
statutory floor, which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue
'lawful business' by 'lawful acts."'); see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 4.01 cmt. d ("The concept of profit enhancement is also qualified
by the provision in § 2.01(b)(1) that obliges the corporation 'to the same extent as a
natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law."').
9. Miller, 507 F.2d at 762. New York formerly applied a "net loss" rule
whereby plaintiffs had to prove that the violation of the law caused the corporation
a "net loss" after offsetting any corporate benefits gained. See Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498 (1969) (abandoning the rule); see also A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.18(c) & cmt. e; John A. Humbach,
DirectorLiabilityfor CorporateCrimes: Lawyers as Safe Haven?, 55 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 437, 440-41 n.12 (2011) (arguing that the net-loss rule is at odds with
social and criminal policy).
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This raises the question: which laws demand compliance and
implicate these corporate fiduciary duties?10 Should the corporatelaw rules apply to all laws and regulations, just laws, just criminal
laws, just criminal laws prohibiting mala in se, or what? Corporatelaw scholarship, primarily from the law-and-economics school of
thought, has variously answered this question, with most
commentators drawing this line somewhere between laws concerning
12
mala in se and those concerning mala prohibita.
Corporate-law
cases are less clear on this point but certainly take a tougher stance
than the scholarship recommends. The violation in the principal
casebook case involves illegal corporate campaign-finance
contributions, I 3 and other cases involve a wide range of criminal and

10. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) ("[M]anagers do not have
an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just because they exist. They
must determine the importance of these laws.").
11. Laws prohibiting mala in se address wrongs that are bad in and of
themselves, morally wrong, or otherwise offend the conscience, such as murder,
arson, and rape. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (9th ed. 2009). Mala
prohibita,by contrast, include acts that are not inherently wrong or immoral but
rather unlawful merely because they have been prohibited, such as jaywalking. See
id.
12. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523,
1524-25 (1984) (distinguishing between "regulatory law" and criminal laws);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1168 n.36 ("We put to one side laws
concerning violence or other acts thought to be malum in se."); Stephen L. Pepper,
Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudenceand Ethics
of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1578 (1995) (advocating compliance with laws
that "involve[] what is by clear societal consensus a serious and substantial moral
wrong."); see also Smith v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 981 F.2d 1326, 1328 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Douglas Ginsburg, J.) (distinguishing, in a different context, between
situations where a "regulatory rather than a moral or criminal norm is concerned");

A.L.I.,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

§ 7.19 cmt. f (permitting director

exculpation where director conduct is not "morally reprehensible under generally
prevailing standards"). But see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with
the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1325-27 (1998) (arguing
that regulatory laws, including most environmental laws, should also merit
corporate compliance because they are so technically complex that they are
difficult to gauge morally); see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 101
(2006) ("These distinctions may not work in all situations, and at times courts will
have to engage in fine line-drawing.").
13. See Miller, 507 F.2d at 761.
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civil violations, from the mundane to the serious. 14 The scholarship,
in other words, does not accurately describe the corporate law duty to
comply with applicable laws and creates an issue, in the academic
literature at least, where none previously existed.
B.

Law andEconomics

Wherever one draws this line, settled corporate law requires
compliance with certain laws, and corporate decisions to deliberately
flout those laws amount to a breach of fiduciary duties. This creates
some tension with the "shareholder primacy" norm in American
business-the conventional view that companies should aim to
prioritize shareholder interests above all other considerationsinsofar as corporate non-compliance may sometimes prove more
15
profitable than adherence to the law.
Economist Milton Friedman offered a straightforward resolution to
this tension in his oft-quoted statement on corporate social
responsibility: "[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of
business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed 'to
16
increase its profits so long as itstays within the rules of the game."
14. See, e.g., Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 312-13 (Ala. 2011) (criminal
fraud) (applying Delaware law); Louisiana Mun. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46
A.3d 313, 317-18 (Del. Ch. 2012) (marketing Botox for off-label uses in violation
of FDA regulations); In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479 at *5-* 10 (Mine Safety and
Health Administration violations); Desimone, 924 A.2d at 934-35 (alleged
violation SEC and IRS disclosure obligations); Davis v. Dyson, 900 N.E.2d 698,
712-16 (Ill. 2008) (violation of Illinois Condo Act's insurance requirements); Roth
v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (violation of Sunday Blue Laws
requiring business closures); see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 2.01 cmt. g(10) (using a speed-limit example to demonstrate the
corporate law obligation to obey the law).
15. For a detailed examination of the shareholder primacy norm and its status in
corporate law, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012), Judd F.
Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation and ShareholderProfits, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV.541 (2011) [hereinafter Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation], and Judd
F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability,and a New Paradigmfor
Corporate Governance, 94 IowA L. REV.987 (2008).
16. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th anniversary ed.
2002) (emphasis added); see also Thomas S. Coleman, Corporate Social
Responsibility: Friedman's View, available at https://bfi.uchicago.edu/featurestory/corporate-social-responsibilty-friedmans-view,
archived
at
https://perma.cc/Z4Y8-GBRJ (arguing that it is up to "the rest of us to establish a
framework of laws... [to] push profit-maximizing firms to behave 'responsibly').

2015]

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W RE VIE W

Friedman's position thus aligns with the corporate law doctrine set
out above, that firms may "pursue diverse means to make a profit,
subject to a critical statutory floor,
[that] corporations only pursue
' ,, I7
acts.
'lawful
by
business'
'lawful
More recent law-and-economics scholarship resolves this tension
differently and controversially. The more recent scholarship takes the
view that not all laws demand corporate compliance. According to
this scholarship, only some laws-criminal laws and other laws
prohibiting violent or otherwise inherently wrongful acts-should be
treated as non-negotiable obligations and merit full compliance. 8
Other laws carry no such moral imperative, says the scholarship, and
so corporate and other actors may justifiably opt to violate the law
and pay whatever penalties the laws prescribe.1 9
Next, when faced with a regulation in this latter category-where
laws and penalties are viewed as mere prices for non-compliancelaw and economics would have firms conduct a cost-benefit analysis
and comply only where the benefits of compliance outweigh its costs.
This way, a firm can achieve the seemingly efficient result and
maximize profits and, ultimately, shareholder returns.2 °
Consider the following illustration. Suppose a manufacturing
facility can save $80,000 a month by switching to a lower-grade fuel,
but by making the switch the firm would likely violate the Clean Air
Act 2 an average of four times a month. 22 If the assessed fine under

17. In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479 at *20; see also supra notes 4,
8-9 (citing cases).
18. See Cooter, supra note 12, at 1524-25 (treating such laws as limits);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1168 n.36 (same); Williams, supra note
12, at 1269 (labeling these laws as "mandatory" as opposed to "voluntary").
19. See Cooter, supra note 12, at 1524-25 (treating these laws as prices for noncompliance); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1168 n.36, 1177 n.57
(same).
20. See Williams, supra note 12, at 1267 (describing the "plausible view (but
one that is also flawed) ... of 'efficient investment in compliance' . . . since it
would be economically inefficient to invest more in compliance that one risks in
fines"); see also Humbach, supra note 9, at 440 (noting that any "'efficiency' gains
are misleading ...[in that] they ignore externalities").
21. CleanAir Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515 (2012).
22. The example is adapted from WILLIAM T.ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 294 (3d ed. 2009).
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the Clean Air Act would be $25,000 per violation, 23 a cost-benefit
analysis would suggest that compliance is the better, economically
efficient choice in that the potential fines ($25,000 times four or
$100,000) outweigh the projected fuel-cost savings ($80,000).
However, if there is less than a 100% chance that the authorities
will detect the Clean Air Act violations, the cost side of the equation
should adjust to reflect this reality.24 For example, if the likelihood of
being caught is 90%, the average monthly cost of non-compliance
drops 10% to $90,000-still more than the monthly benefits of using
the lower-grade fuel, 25 but the discounts do not end there. The
Environmental Protection Agency routinely settles enforcement
actions at less than the face value of the fines it levies. 26 If a Clean

23. The current maximum penalty for Clean Air Act violations is $37,500 per
day per violation. See 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2014). However, the average fine the EPA
assesses is quite less. See Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes:
Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781, 802 (1991) (noting the average
Clean Air Act violation is about 60% of the maximum amount); David B. Spence,
The Shadow of the RationalPolluter: Rethinking the Role of RationalActor Models
in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 968 (2001) ("[T]he average fines
imposed by the EPA tend to be well below the statutory maxima."). The $25,000
figure in the example is thus a realistic amount.
24. See Spence, supra note 23, at 968 ("EPA resource limitations hamper
monitoring efforts,... the frequency of inspection is often less than once a year."
(citing studies)); id. at 974 ("Firms know from experience that ["the probability of
non-compliance will be detected"] is small."); id at 968 n.239 (acknowledging that
the "infrequency of inspections invites the inference that detected noncompliance
represents a small fraction of actual noncompliance"); see also David L. Markell &
Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REv. 1,
45-49 (2014) (expressing concerns about the enforcement of federal and state
environmental protection programs).
25. See GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 75 (describing the cost of illegality as
"the expected penalty-the fine or other costs discounted by the chance that the
corporation will be caught in its illegality"); Williams, supra note 12, at 1291
(noting the law-and-economics tendency to discount "penalties by the likelihood of
detection and successful enforcement of violations").
26. Although the "agency's penalty policies state that the EPA will not settle a
case for an amount less than the economic benefit of noncompliance," Spence,
supra note 23, at 921, settlements tend to be much lower than the statutory
prescriptions. See, e.g., Administrative Settlement Agreement, No. 12-8009,
between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Suzuki Motor Corporation
(settling 25,000 separate Clean Air Act violations for $885,000 or $35.40 each),
available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/suzuki-agr.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/V4GQ-5U6L. For the full, searchable list EPA
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Air Act violation can be settled for 90% of the total amount of the
fines, 27 the $90,000 drops another 10% to $81,000. Alternatively, if
the firm wishes to contest its liability and there is a 10% chance it
would not be held liable, 2 8 we are again down to $81,000-still more
than the expected savings of non-compliance, but not by much.
Now for one final discount: if the firm has to pay the $81,000 in
Clean Air Act fines following an eventual settlement or judgment,
the time-value of money must also be deducted. That is, to
meaningfully compare the immediate $80,000 in fuel-cost savings
with the future expected obligation to pay $81,000, the fines must be
stated in present-value terms. Applying a conservative 5% discount
rate, and assuming the fines are to be paid one year from the date of
the violation, the present-value of the fines becomes $77,142-less
than the present-value of the benefits of non-compliance. 29
As the illustration demonstrates, these discounts can add up and
can tip the scales in favor of non-compliance. To make matters
worse, managers do not run these cost-benefit analyses perfectly;
they tend to "underestimate the chances of getting caught in [the]
illegal act, overestimate the potential benefits of breaking the law,
and underestimate the potential penalties., 30 Thus, firms adhering to
settlements,
see
U.S.
EPA,
Civil
Cases
and
Settlements,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/,
archived at http://perma.cc/A7AYWZSR.
27. In light of the previous footnote, the 90% settlement discount used in the
example is probably very conservative.
28. See Williams, supra note 12, at 1291. For simplicity's sake, the example
does not consider the firm's costs incurred in settling or litigating the violation.
Even with such an adjustment, the point remains the same: that settling or litigating
will typically result in the payment of an amount less than the face value of the
violation.
29. Present value is calculated using the formula: PV-FV/I+r, "where PV is the
present value, FV is the amount that will be paid at the conclusion of one year, and
r is the annual discount rate." ALLEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 121. The Clean Air
Act does not provide for prejudgment interest, which would counteract this
discount, although the fine calculations are meant to disgorge any benefits gained
from non-compliance. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2012)
(considering the "economic benefit of noncompliance" among other penalty
assessment criteria); 40 C.F.R. § 94.1106 ("In determining the amount of any civil
penalty... the Administrator shall take into account.., the economic benefit or
savings (if any) resulting from the violation").
30. GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 87 & n.46 ("The evaluation of risk is
notoriously faulty."); see also Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths,
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this law-and-economics view of optional corporate compliance and
profit maximization will sometimes fail to comply with applicable
laws when a proper cost-benefit analysis would recommend
compliance.
This cost-benefit analysis approach, however, completely ignores
the fundamental economics concept of externalities. 31 An externality
is "the effect of a transaction ...

on a third party who has not

32
consented to or played any role in carrying out of that transaction.,
Negative externalities in the business context represent costs of doing
business that are not borne by the firm and instead shifted onto
others.33 For example, a business that pollutes imposes the health and
clean-up costs of that pollution on the environment and the firm's
neighbors, 34 just as a firm that fails to guard against workplace
hazards imposes the costs of any eventual injuries on its employees
and the health-care system. Notably, this holds true even where the
firm complies with all applicable regulations, only polluting at
allowable levels and meeting minimum workplace safety standards.
Even there, any allowable pollution or workplace hazards constitute
costs of production not borne by the company and imposed onto
others.35
Negative externalities pose several problems. First, they paint an
incomplete and thus inaccurate picture of a company's operations
Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REv. 531, 536 (2002) (suggesting

inefficiencies within firms can, depending on the firm, lead to unexpected,
seemingly irrational decisionmaking).

31. British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou developed the concept in 1920. See
ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).

His proposed
solution-a so-called "Pigovian" tax to internalize these avoided costs and restore
market efficiency-has regained currency as an approach to address climate
change. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the
Pigou Club, 35 EASTERN ECON. J. 14, 16 (2009) (tracing the origins of current
carbon-tax proposals to Pigou).
32. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND POWER 61 (2004) (quoting Milton Friedman); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 72 (9th ed. 2014) (defining negative
externalities as costs external to a firm's decisionmaking process).
33. See BAKAN, supra note 32, at 61 (citing Friedman).
34. Pigou uses a pollution example, as well, noting that Manchester factories
imposed measurable laundry cost increases on area residents not present in cleaner
towns. See PIGOU, supra note 31, at 185 n.18.
35. See BAKAN, supra note 32, at 61 (noting that externalities both save the firm
expenses and impose those expenses on involuntary third parties).
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and finances. As a result, a firm will produce and price its goods and
services at non-optimal, inefficient levels, understandably taking
advantage of the costs not incurred. 36 This troubles economists, who
tend to value efficiency,37 and calls into question the value of some
cost-benefit analyses suggesting the payment of fines in lieu of
compliance. Second, misplacing the costs of production like this is
doubly unfair: not only do producing firms evade costs they should
be incurring, but unwitting, unwilling third parties absorb them
instead. 38 And third, those third parties absorb the externalized costs

involuntarily; economists tend to prefer
voluntary transactions in
39
which both parties become better off.

The economics solution to this problem is to have firms internalize
their externalities, for example by compensating third parties for the
costs imposed on them, paying for environmental remediation, and so
on. 40 Alternatively, one can impose a tax on firms to approximate
36. On the chart below, when the full (including social) costs of production are
considered, the firm produces and sells a smaller quantity of goods (Qs) at a higher
price (Ps).

I

l$

-I'

l>t $1

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/externality.
37. See, e.g., PIGOU, supra note 31, at 172; Mankiw, supra note 31, at 16-19
(considering externalities a "market failure" and noting that where there are
externalities "Adam Smith's invisible hand will fail to lead to an efficient
outcome").
38. Cf Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass

of Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 991, 1000 & n.39 (2009) (citing Fuller,
Purdue, and Aristotle: "'the restitution interest involving a combination of unjust
impoverishment with unjust gain' presents the strongest case for relief' if our goal
is Aristotle's justice where we keep an 'equilibrium of goods among members of
society'); see also Humbach, supra note 9, at 440 ("[A]ny attempt to boost profits
by foisting costs on others is essentially the same as stealing.").
39. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 6, 12, 16-17.
40. See, e.g., Pigou, supra note 31, at 192-96. But see Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (challenging Pigou's view that
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these expenses so that the firm's production levels and costs attain
41
optimal, efficient levels, even if third parties are not made whole.
This approach has many adherents in economics and policy circles, 42
because it solves externality problems and addresses environmental
harm, and does so efficiently, elegantly, and without undue
governmental intervention.4 3
C. The Reality of CorporateCompliance
Exactly how widespread is this problem of corporate noncompliance? Anecdotal evidence suggests that most firms comply
with applicable laws,4 4 or at least they try to do so,4 5 because the
firms' decision-makers view compliance as the "right thing to do,"
because they have internalized the laws' goals and "believe they are

externalities should always be internalized). For an innovative application of
Pigou's thesis, see Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning
of Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221, 221-23 (2011)
(defining corporate social responsibility as the voluntary internalization of a firm's
externalities).
41. Of course, the taxes collected could be used to ameliorate environmental
harms, though they could also be used for other purposes. See Janet Milne,
Environmental Taxation: Why Theory Matters, in 1 CRITICAL ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 1, 5-12 (Janet Milne et al. eds., 2003) (describing the
"polluter pays" principle and a "double dividend" approach where environmental
taxes offset other tax burdens); see also Mankiw, supra note 31, at 16.
42. These adherents call themselves the "Pigou Club." See The Pigou Club
Manifesto,
GREG
MANKIW'S
BLOG,
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/10/pigou-club-manifesto.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/2ZXK-Q5LA (describing the Club's membership as "an elite group
of pundits and policy wonks with the good sense to advocate higher Pigovian
taxes").
43. See, e.g., Mankiw, supra note 31, at 14-23. Even Milton Friedman seems to
have been in support of, or at least tolerated, internalizing externalities. See
Coleman, supra note 16, at 20 (opining that Milton Friedman would support the
idea of internalizing externalities whereby the "firm still maximizes profits, but the
profits account for the pollution costs now included in the cost of doing business").
44. See Stacy Watson May, Holland & Knight, Presentation at the 15th
Northeast Florida Environmental Summit, Florida Coastal School of Law (Feb. 27,
2014) (stating that firms want to comply with environmental regulations, and that
more sophisticated ones do).
45. See Spence, supra note 23, at 968 ("[O]ne wonders why firms are trying so
hard to comply ...and why they can't come close to perfect compliance, given the
levels of effort they expend.").
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important," or "because they see themselves as law-abiding. 4 6 And
to the extent firms find themselves out of compliance, it seems to be
more a function of not understanding often-complex laws than 47
a
profits.
maximize
to
order
in
law
the
flout
to
choice
conscious
There are certainly instances of deliberate corporate non-compliance
in the business world-and in the headlines4 8 -but the practice
seems to be less pervasive than the law-and-economics scholarship
recommends.
II. CORPORATE LAW SOLUTIONS
The law-and-economics view that compliance obligations should
be treated as optional costs of doing business is thus wrong as a
matter of corporate law, wrong as a matter of law and economics, and
not in fact how most firms behave. As for the firms that do flout
applicable laws in the name of profit, the next two Parts suggest
corporate-law proposals and other solutions to rebalance and tilt the
cost-benefit analyses in favor of compliance.

46. See id. at 970-71 (citing literature and also suggesting that firms'
decisionmakers favor compliance even where non-compliance would be more
profitable because the decisionmakers themselves do not stand to gain-and may in
fact stand to lose-from the non-compliance).
47. See id. at 974-75 ("[P]erfect compliance is almost impossible to achieve
even for sophisticated and conscientious firms ... and many violations result from
sincere disagreements or differing interpretations of what EPA regulations mean.");
see also Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 2013 ENVTL FORUM 22, 24
("[The EPA has] learned over years of hard experience is that compliance is better
when the rules are simple and clear.").
48. The BP oil spill and Massey coal-mining explosion are two recent highprofile examples. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit:
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil
Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983 (2011) (casting the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico as a failure of corporate law and shareholder wealth maximization); Kris
Maher, Feds Blame Owner of West Virginia Mine, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2011,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052970204770404577082341518182150
I archived at http://perma.cc/E32K-V2KH ("The deadliest mining disaster in 40
years was the result of a workplace culture that valued production over safety,
federal regulators said .... ).
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EnvironmentalLaws as Limits

One response to the law-and-economics argument that some laws
are mandatory and other laws are voluntary is to move more laws
into the mandatory "law as limit" category. Cynthia Williams took
this tack, among others, in her 1998 law review article on corporate
compliance.4 9 She argued, in part, that the mala in se/malum
prohibitum distinction is difficult to apply to complex rules that are
the product of regulatory expertise by administrative agencies. 50 The
critique is particularly apt in the environmental context: does
pollution beyond an agency-determined allowable amount "involve[]
what is by clear societal consensus a serious and substantial moral
51
wrong,?
Who knows, but in our society we have empowered a
technically expert administrative agency ... to study the
issue, to consider the economic and health effects of
permitting discharges at various levels ... , and to make a
binding decision. It is precisely because 'most of us would
not have an immediate answer' about 'whether or not it is
wrong to discharge .060 grams of ammonia per liter of
water effluent' that we need a rule developed by
experts ...
. [B]y denying the mandatory nature of
regulatory law, the law-as-price view denies us law
precisely where we need it most: in the regulatory arena,
where there is not a societal consensus, where there is not
an obvious moral component to the standards the law sets,
and where humanistic concerns and economic self-interest
collide most acutely.52
Alternatively and more simply, one could answer the hypothetical
in the affirmative: yes, intentionally contaminating the air we breathe
and the water we drink is morally wrong, as is endangering the health
and safety of one's workers, to take another example. Williams's
49. See Williams, supra note 12, at 1265.
50. See id. at 1325. Williams also challenged the theory, logic, and premises
behind the "law as price" position. See, e.g., id. at 1324-25.
51. See id. at 1299 (paraphrasing the mala in se standard in Pepper, supra note
12, at 1578).
52. Id. at 1326-27.
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argument calls into question the usefulness of the mala in se/malum
prohibitum distinction (and similar formulations) and would shift
entire swaths of administrative regulation, including environmental
laws, into the law-and-economics category of mandatory limits that
merit compliance.
B.

Ultra Vires Doctrine

A second corporate-law approach to corporate compliance invokes
the ultra vires doctrine to in effect increase the penalties associated
with illegal corporate activity. Kent Greenfield first advanced this
theory in a 2001 law review article, breathing new life into the
vestigial corporate law doctrine.53
Ultra vires or "beyond [the] powers, 54 describes actions
corporations are unauthorized to take, either because of limitations
placed on them in state corporate codes or because of limitations
55
written into their charters. If a corporation exceeds its powers or
purposes, such acts are ultra vires, illegal, null, and void. A firm
could thus not be held to ultra vires contracts, and the corporate
directors or officers responsible for ultra vires acts could be held
personally liable to the corporation for any resulting losses.56 The
ultra vires doctrine thus stands for the proposition that "the
corporation [is] a legal57entity of enumerated powers, beyond which
the firm could not go.",
But corporate statutes have evolved to become more "enabling"
than regulatory, and, consequently, today's corporate codes place few

53. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of
Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce
InternationalLaw Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); see also GREENFIELD,
supra note 12, at 73-105 (reprising his earlier article); Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent
Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions,
Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling
CorporateBehavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929 (2005).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1662 (9th ed. 2009).
55. For Delaware's list of corporate powers, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 12123 (2014). See also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (enumerating general
corporate powers).
56. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICs 58
(2002); GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 78.
57. GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 78.
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restrictions on corporate activity. 58 In addition, states no longer grant
corporate charters sparingly and for narrowly defined purposes, as
they once did.59 Rather, forming a corporation today is a
"straightforward process," and states and corporate charters currently
need not, and do not, limit corporate purposes.6 ° Indeed, those
companies that state a corporate purpose in their charters use broad,
generic language along the lines of "the purpose of the corporation is
to engage in any lawful act.",6 1 As a result, there is little unauthorized
62
corporate action left for the ultra vires doctrine to police.
What is left, Greenfield recognized, is the power to engage in
unlawful activity. 63 Decisions to break the law exceed corporations'
admittedly broad powers and continue to be ultra vires. Invoking the
ultra vires doctrine, shareholders may thus hold decision-makers
accountable to the corporation for any resulting fines and seek
injunctive relief, as well.64 What is more, Greenfield argues that
shareholders have incentives to bring such actions: shareholders
would not want executives to break the law as a general proposition
58. See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 542-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(chronicling the decline in corporate regulation); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 56, at
39-40 ("Until fairly recently, governments regarded business corporations with
considerable suspicion and therefore closely regulated them."); GREENFIELD, supra
note 12, at 77 (noting also that the doctrine limited corporations' "economic power
and influence" and protected "shareholders from managerial overreaching").
59. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 56, at 39-40, 58; GREENFIELD, supra note 12,
at 79-80.
60. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 56, at 39-40, 58; GREENFIELD, supra note 12,
at 79 (noting that states and shareholders both "came to recognize that their
interests.., would be served by a weakening of the doctrine").
61. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2014) (explaining that this language
is a sufficient statement of the corporation's purpose). Delaware requires corporate
charters to include such a statement, see id.; most other states do not, see, e.g., REv.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02, and presume a "purpose of engaging in any lawful
business." Id. § 3.01.
62. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 56, at 58-60 (calling the ultra vires doctrine
"largely a dead letter"); GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 81 ("[Ultra vires] has been
called statutory 'dead wood' .... ").
63. See GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 94 ("[A] remaining sliver of the [ultra
vires] doctrine seeks to ensure that corporations stay within legal bounds.").
64. See id. at 94-97 ("Any loss to the corporation from illegality-including
fines, judgments or losses in stock value because of reputational harm-would be
recoverable from the individuals responsible for having the corporation act beyond
its authority."). Attorneys general can also bring suits to enforce the ultra vires
doctrine. See id. at 97-98.
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because such law-breaking often comes at shareholders' expense,
and illegal acts tend to injure firms' reputations and long-term
interests. 66 Firms' other stakeholders-the state, the firms' creditors,
and its managers and employees-would likewise not want the
corporation to break the law. 67 Best of all, the ultra vires doctrine
remains good law; 68 no legislative action need be taken to invoke the
doctrine to keep corporations operating within the law.69
C. (Better)Disclose Environmental Compliance
A third corporate-law approach to improve corporate compliance
relies on corporate disclosures and "shaming" firms that are out of
compliance. Disclosing firms' compliance policies and track records,
either as a securities-law matter or as a function of environmental or
labor law and policy, would likely "affect corporate conduct ' 70 in
that firms would not want to publicize policies and facts "that

65. See id. at 84-85 (noting that "the kinds of illegal acts that corporate
executives would likely commit [like fraud and self-dealing] ...

often hurt

shareholders").
66. See id. at 85.
67. See id. at 81-94.
68. In every state except in North Dakota, strangely. See Sulkowski &
Greenfield, supra note 53, at 945.
69. See GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 105. Greenfield additionally argues that
the ultra vires doctrine could be used to enforce international laws, see id. at 10205, and a recent case pursuing this strategy has met with initial success. See
Louisiana Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996-ML (Del.
Ch. Mar. 18, 2014) (denying Hershey's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' books-andrecords action seeking documents to support a separate action to hold Hershey
managers to task for using cocoa suppliers that violate international child-labor
laws).
70. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1210-11 (1999) (noting
that Congress intended the securities laws' disclosure requirements to "affect
corporate conduct"); see also Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30
ENVTL. FORUM 22, 24 (2013) ("[T]here is powerful evidence that publishing
information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is
applied by customers, neighbors, investors, and insurers."); Markell & Glicksman,
supra note 24, at 70-71 (touting "the promise of transparency as a tool to improve
compliance" and noting the EPA's suggestion "that public pressure and greater
regulated party self-awareness can both motivate better performance").
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shareholders could interpret as negative." 71 Firms would likewise not
want to publicize policies and practices that regulators would hold
against them in determining environmental and other fines, 72 or that
would turn off consumers. On the positive side, disclosure can
"draw[] attention to problems and bring[] senior-level focus to bear
on fixing them," as well as show "companies how
their peers
73
perform, and.., that better performance is possible.,
Generally speaking, the federal securities laws do not require
companies to make such disclosures unless the potential financial
consequences would have a material impact on the company.74 The
Environmental Protection Agency fills some of this gap, publishing

71. Williams, supra note 70, at 1295 (noting that "there would be a 'shrinking
quality' to actions that managers would be willing to take in relative secrecy, but
would not want to disclose to their shareholders or to have published on the
published on the front page of the New York Times"); see also Felix Frankfurter,
The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55 ("[P]ublicity is
potent ... to force knowledge of [excessive commissions and salaries] into the
open is largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely pursued in private
lose their justification in public."); David A. Skeel Jr., Shaming in CorporateLaw,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). This assumes that shareholders would view noncompliance negatively, which Greenfield posits would be the case. See supra note
65 and accompanying text (noting Greenfield's argument that shareholders should
favor compliance over non-compliance purported to maximize profits).
72. Clean Air Act fines, for example, are higher for repeat offenders. See Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2012) (considering "the violator's full compliance
history and good faith efforts to comply" in determining penalties); 40 C.F.R. §

94.1106 (2014) (same); U.S. EPA, A

FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC
APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESSMENT: IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON CIVIL
PENALTIES 3-4, 21-22 (Feb. 16, 1984) [hereinafter EPA PENALTY FRAMEWORK],

available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/policy-civil-penalties-epa-generalenforcement-policy-gm-21, archived at http://perma.cc/HX7Y-3LFA (considering
a firm's history of non-compliance and its degree of willfulness in calculating
penalty amounts).
73. Giles, supra note 47, at 25.
74. See Williams, supra note 70, at 1208 (noting the securities laws'
"materiality filter" and further noting Regulation S-K, Item 103's helpful
"materiality benchmark of 10% of the current assets of the issuer, except in an
environmental proceeding against a government entity, in which case proceedings
with the possibility of a $100,000 fine must be disclosed" (referencing 17 C.F.R. §
229.103 (2015) & instructions 2 & 5, which presume that such a fine is per se
material)). That said, many U.S. firms voluntarily make environmental and social
responsibility disclosures. See Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation, supra note
15, at 558 & n.81 (reporting on this trend).
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information about its compliance and enforcement actions on its
websites. 75 These websites are great but could be better and betterutilized. For example, the enforcement information of these sites is
limited to recently concluded actions, and searchable but awkwardly
so and in limited ways.76 Consequently, firms that violate
environmental laws do not garner nearly the amount of negative
publicity that they otherwise might.
One way to accomplish greater disclosure of corporate noncompliance is to simply improve and better publicize the EPA's, and
other agencies', websites to heighten the negative publicity
77
associated with violating environmental and other laws .
Alternatively and less realistically, the securities laws could be
amended to require firms to more fully disclose their compliance
policies and practices, even where those policies and practices do not
necessarily cross the materiality threshold. 78 Firms wishing to avoid
such publicity, and the reputational and other costs that bad press
brings, would have this extra incentive to comply with the law.79

75. See
U.S.
EPA,
Civil
Cases
and Settlements,
EPA.GOV,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/, archived at http://perma.cc/HX7Y; U.S.
EPA, Toxics Release Inventory, EPA.Gov, archived at http://perma.cc/H87Y
http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program; U.S. EPA, Enforcement
and Compliance History Online, EPA.Gov, http://echo.epa.gov, archived at
http://perma.cc/ARTG; see also Giles, supra note 47, at 25 (crediting the Toxics
Release Inventory with "a significant drop in emissions"). There is a similar
website for OSHA violations. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA's Statistics & Data
Page, https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
CCU5-6LSY (offering limited OSHA complaint and violation data).
76. As a result, while the Toxics Release Inventory names a locality's worst
offenders, it is difficult to obtain an area's most penalized polluters.
77. See Giles, supra note 47, at 24 ("Public disclosure is [an] underutilized tool:
there is powerful evidence that publishing information about company performance
drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by customers, neighbors, investors,
and insurers"); Markell & Glicksman, supra note 24, at 20-21 (noting
environmental statutes' reporting requirements and their impact on compliance).
78. Such disclosure requirements may be coming, if indirectly. The European
Union Council Directive 2014/95/EU, published in late 2014, will require covered
businesses, including those based in the United States but having a significant
enough presence in an EU member state, to make social, environmental, and
governance disclosures. Enforcement of the provision will begin in 2017.
79. In cost-benefit analysis terms, the bad press would increase the costs of noncompliance, perhaps tipping the scale in favor of compliance. See supra Part I.B;
infra Part III.C.
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III. OTHER SOLUTIONS

Other approaches to improving corporate compliance involve
working within the cost-benefit analysis and discounting some firms'
conduct in determining whether to abide by applicable laws.
Specifically, the recommendations below either make corporate
compliance with legal requirements more attractive, or make
corporate non-compliance less attractive. Examples include
improving enforcement, enhancing the penalties associated with
environmental and other violations, and otherwise manipulating the
costs and benefits of compliance so as to tilt the scale in favor of
compliance. What is more, these approaches, if successful, will both
improve corporate compliance and also make environmental and
other statutes more effective in achieving, or at least advancing, their
goals. 80
A.

Improve Enforcement

Environmental laws are poorly enforced, 81 perhaps deliberately
so. 82 Consequently, businesses that fail to comply with environmental
laws and other regulations are less likely to get caught and therefore
less likely to have to pay any resulting fines. Factoring this reality
into a cost-benefit analysis means discounting any possible penalties,
83
thereby decreasing the "cost" side of the non-compliance equation.
Improving enforcement would lessen the impact of this discount

80. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 887, 910

("The main goal of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (and still its main goal today) was
the attainment, 100% of the time, of national ambient air quality standards .... ).
81. See Giles, supra note 47, at 22-23 ("[A] small number of federal and state
enforcers cannot effectively police millions of regulated facilities."); Markell &
Glicksman, supra note 24, at 29-36.
82. See id. at 50-51 ("Environmental group spokespersons have characterized
EPA budget cuts as an indirect way to weaken environmental regulations, likening
the situation to a 'death by a thousand cuts."'); see also David Barstow, When
Workers Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21-23, 2003 (demonstrating that U.S. workplace
safety rules are weak and dramatically under-enforced).
83. See supra Part I.B.
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while of course helping the environmental laws achieve, or at least
advance, their stated goals.84
The enforcement trend right now seems to be going in the other
direction, however, with fewer resources being allocated to
environmental protection generally and enforcement efforts in
particular. 85 What is worse, these declining resources have coincided
with increases in environmental regulators' responsibilities, further
hampering effective enforcement. 86 Improving enforcement may be
difficult or impractical in the current political environment, but it
represents one obvious, effective approach to improve the problem of
corporate compliance.
B.

Enhance Penalties

Another means of improving corporate compliance is to enhance
the penalties charged for statutory violations. One goal in setting the
amount of environmental fines is to remove any financial benefits
gained from polluting in violation of the law. 87 When firms discount
these statutory penalties to account for the likelihood of getting
84. Better enforcement would also raise additional funds by virtue of additional
fines levied and collected.
85. See Markell & Glicksman, supra note 24, at 50 ("[F]unding freezes or
declines have affected the[] capacity to conduct activities such as permitting,

inspections, and monitoring, all of which are critical to effective enforcement.").
But see id. at 52 (noting "innovative enforcement approaches that use new

monitoring and reporting technologies" that may alleviate some budgetary
pressures).
86. See id. at 55-56 (noting "increase[s] in the number of regulated entities;
increases in regulatory responsibilities and mandates for agencies and regulated
entities alike; implementation of programs that depend on making difficult causal

connections between regulated activities and environmental harms; a movement in
some contexts away from uniform regulatory treatment toward differentiated
responsibility ...

; and a commitment to target significant violations by smaller

sources that have not traditionally been the focus of enforcement attention and
activity").
87. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (considering the "economic

benefit of noncompliance" among other penalty assessment criteria); 40 C.F.R. §
94.1106 (2014) ("In determining the amount of any civil penalty... the
Administrator shall take into account.., the economic benefit or savings (if any)
resulting from the violation"); EPA PENALTY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 6

(establishing "deterrence

as an important goal of penalty assessment" and

specifying "that any penalty should, at a minimum, remove any significant benefits

resulting from noncompliance" (emphasis in original)).
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caught, the likelihood of having to pay the full amount of the fine,
and the time value of money, however, the fines fall short of this goal
and lose much of their deterrent value.88 Regulators can anticipate
and counteract this discounting by increasing statutory penalties so
that the penalties for deliberate non-compliance, even when
discounted, still reflect the intended statutory amounts.
Imposing civil liability on individual corporate actors provides
additional, powerful incentives for corporate compliance with
applicable laws. As noted above, corporate decisionmakers may
already be held personally responsible for their decisions to violate
applicable laws under corporate-law theories; 89 some environmental
laws hold individual corporate officers and employees civilly
accountable, as well, provided they are sufficiently involved in the
firm's polluting or compliance decisions. 90
Criminal liability for corporate non-compliance can be a powerful
incentive, as well; as two commentators aptly put it, corporate actors
"can sometimes better 'focus' corporate attention on environmental
compliance if [they] understand that they place their personal wealth
and liberty at risk for knowing violations of the law." 91
Environmental and other laws already deploy the criminal law, both
at the corporate level 92 and at the individual level against responsible
88. See supra Part I.B.

89. See supra notes 5-7 and 64 (discussing breach of fiduciary duty and ultra
vires theories) and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998)
(interpreting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) to impose liability on those who "manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically related to pollution ... or decisions about
compliance with environmental regulations"). But see James Miskiewicz & John S.
Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Air Act After the 1990

Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 333 (1992) ("[I]t is exceedingly rare for
[the] EPA in a civil action to sue corporate personnel in their capacity as
individuals.").
91. Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 90, at 373; see also Spence, supra note 23,
at 923 ("[T]he environmental criminal enforcement system is designed to
complement the civil enforcement system and to strengthen the disincentives to
noncompliance facing rational polluters.").
92. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1105 (7th
ed. 2013) ("The Justice Department has taken the position that a corporation can be
held criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its employees if the acts were done to
benefit the corporation and related to the employee's duties, whether or not the acts
violated the corporation's policies or employee's duties, and whether or not the
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corporate officers and employees,93 although there is some debate
about the propriety of holding "responsible" but otherwise
uninvolved individuals criminally liable. 94 Enhancing civil and
criminal penalties for deliberate noncompliance with applicable laws
would no doubt increase compliance efforts and results; the
likelihood of such increases, as noted above, will depend on political
forces that currently seem to be trending in the other direction.
C. Rebalance Costs andBenefits
Increasing the benefits of compliance and other costs of noncompliance will likewise encourage firms to conclude that
compliance is the better course. Compliance with environmental
regulations already offers firms a host of financial and other benefits.
In addition to avoiding fines and associated legal expenses,
environmental compliance can improve workers' health, healthcare
costs, and productivity; make the firm better prepared and more
competitive if and when stricter environmental regulations go into
effect; and improve the company's image with the public including
potential buyers of the firm's goods and services, employees, and
offending employees had any managerial authority."); see also Spence, supra note
23, at 922 n.20 (citing environmental statutes). Violations of state law require more
involvement. See Jed S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied, New York
Review
of
Books,
Feb.
19,
2015,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/feb/19/justice-deferred-justicedenied/, archived at http://perma.cc/E7C4-72FT ("[M]ost of the fifty states...
restrict the criminal prosecution of companies to cases where, in the words of the
Model Penal Code. . . 'the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a
high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment."').
93. This is not commonly done, however. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG
TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 83 (2014) ("I was
surprised to find that individual officers and employees were often not prosecuted
when the company was. This was particularly true in the more significant cases
involving deferred prosecution agreements and public companies.").
94. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7413(c)(6) (2012) (defining
"person" to include "any responsible corporate officer"); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1362, 1321(b)(5) (2012) (same); Spence, supra note 23, at 94751 (noting a mens rea issue where a corporate officer is held criminally liable for
having, "by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority
either to prevent.., or promptly to correct, the violation.., and.., failed to do
so" (quoting U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 277 (1975)).
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regulators. 95 Adding these benefits to the compliance side of the
equation could make compliance with the law a more attractive
option than illegality.
On the other side of the scale, shaming violators can in effect
supplement existing statutory penalties for non-compliance, as many
consumers and prospective employees would prefer not to conduct
business with firms with bad environmental or labor track records.9 6
Reworking governmental websites to make firms' non-compliance
details more visible to the public, the media, and activists would
heighten these effects and make shaming a more formidable factor to
perhaps tip the scales in favor of corporate compliance.9 7
D. Private Compliance
A final possibility for improving corporate compliance is through
private ordering. Many firms today contractually regulate and
monitor the environmental and labor practices of their suppliers,
insureds, and borrowers, in part to ensure their compliance with
applicable laws, and sometimes to require a level of corporate social
responsibility beyond mere compliance with the law. 98 Failing to
95. The government is one such party that prefers contracting with law-abiding
businesses. See Christine Bader, Obama's Executive OrderHelps Better Employers
Win
Government
Contracts,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Aug.
1,
2014,

http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/aug/O 1/obama-executiveorder-fair-pay-safe-workplaces-blackwater-lehman-barclays-bp-oil,
archived at
http://perma.cc/X85E-BSKD (reporting on a new requirement that firms applying
for federal contracts disclose labor law violations).
96. See supra Part II.C; see, e.g., Simon Birch, How Activism ForcedNike to
Change
its
Ethical
Game,
THE
GUARDIAN,
July
6,
2012,
http ://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-living-blog/2012/jul/06/activismnike, archived at http://perma.cc/3FKK-3TTS ("[T]he 1990s... global boycott
campaign of Nike was so successful that it has now become an object lesson in
how giant corporations can be brought to account by ordinary consumers.").
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adhere to these contractual requirements may mean being dropped
from a supply chain, losing a client, or defaulting on a loan or other
contract. 99 These consequences can be tremendous and may perhaps
deter non-compliance more effectively than public laws ever could.
CONCLUSION

The idea that firms should deliberately violate the law in the name
of profit is troubling. In fact, it is far more troubling than the usual
application of the shareholder primacy model of corporate
governance, that firms should prioritize profits above nonshareholder considerations in choosing among whatever legal
alternatives. As the first half of this Article has shown, further
applying shareholder primacy to compliance decisions goes against
corporate fiduciary duties, law-and-economics principles, and it
seems most firms reject the proposition. To the extent it is a real
problem, there are corporate-law and other solutions to address it,
even in a world where environmental law enforcement and penalties
lag. Many of these boil down to firms' cost-benefit analyses. By
heightening the benefits to be gained from compliance as well as the
costs of non-compliance we can change decision-making for the
better and hopefully bring even the most profit-oriented firms back
into compliance.
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sectors impose environmental requirements on their domestic and foreign
suppliers.").
99. See Killingsworth, supra note 98, at 7-8 (describing common remedies for

breaching these contractual "codes of conduct").

